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Dear Mr. Shea:
I wish to advise the court that the appellant has recently
become aware of a Utah Supreme Court case that the appellant
believes is an authority which supports Point II of the
appellant's argument before the Court of Appeals. The case in
question is Joan F. Stephens v. Brent Henderson, 63 Utah Adv.
Rep. 10 (Ut. August 13, 1987)
The appellant believes the
discussion by the court of a requested jury instruction
concerning assumption of risk, supports the argument made in
Point II of the appellant's brief.
This notice is being given pursuant to Rule 24(j) of the
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Sincerely,

Robert A. Echard
Attorney for Appellant
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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

The jury's verdict and finding of no negligence was

contrary to the facts in evidence and manifestly unjust.
2.

The trial court's instruction to the jury that the

plaintiff

was

required

to

avoid

a

hazardf

constituted

a

prejudical error which misled the jury and thereby resulted in a
verdict contrary to the evidence.
3.

The trial court erred in denying the plaintiff's

motion for new trial on the grounds of insufficiency of evidence
to justify the verdict.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The

plaintiff/appellant,

Lucinda

Deats,

(hereinafter

referred to as Mrs. Deats) initiated this action against the
defendant/respondent,

Commercial

referred

bank)

to

as

the

to

Security
recover

for

Bank,

(hereinafter

personal

injuries

received as a result of a slip and fall occurring on February 27,
1984, at a parking terrace owned and operated by Commercial
Security Bank.

The jury returned a verdict of no cause of action

finding that the bank was not negligent. (R.352)

The plaintiff

filed a motion for a new trial pursuant to Rule 59 of the Utah
Rules

of

Civil

Procedure

alleging

that

the

evidence

was

insufficient to justify the verdict, that there was irregularity
in the proceedings of the jury, and that the court committed an
error in law with reference to Instruction No. 25 requiring Mrs.
Deats to avoid a hazard.

The trial court denied plaintiff's

motion for a new trial and Mrs. Deats now appeals.

Plaintiff/appellant seeks a reversal of the judgment below
and a remand to the district court for a new trial.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
At the time of the accident giving rise to this cause of
action, Mrs. Deats was a 31 year old staff clerk employed by the
United States Forest Service at 324 - 25th Street, Ogden, Utah.
(T.523-525)

Mrs. Deats purchased a parking permit from the bank

allowing her to park her car during all hours of the day on the
fourth level of the Commercial Security Bank parking terrace
across the street from her place of employment. (T.525, 528) (See
also plaintiff's Exhibit 1)

The fourth level of the parking

terrace was uncovered, while the three lower levels were covered
areas. (T.528)
Mrs. Deats had only parked in the parking terrace on a
couple of occasions because her children had been ill and in the
hospital and she had not attended work on a regular basis. After
having been off work for approximately a week, Mrs. Deats parked
her vehicle on the parking terrace on the 27th day of February,
1984, which was a Monday morning.

Mrs. Deats arrived for work at

approximately 7:05 a.m. (T.529, 530)

The bank was aware that

individuals who parked in the terrace came to work as early as
7:00 a.m. (T.532, 602, 714)

The president of the bank often came

to work that early although he did not park on the upper level of
the parking terrace. (T.620, 624, 625)

The employee who had the

responsibility of spreading salt and sand for the bank began work
at approximately 6:30 a.m. (T.612, 823, 834, 835)
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Mrs. Deats was apparently the first person to arrive that
day. (T.532, 533)

Upon arrival Mrs. Deats drove up the ramp to

the fourth level and at the top of the ramp felt her car slide
slightly
Deats

as she turned onto the fourth level.

proceeded

facilitate
wearing

her

to

park

her

exit

that

afternoon.

"moonboots",

then

car

exited

backing

(T.534)

into

(T.539-540)

her

vehicle

a

stall

Mrs.
to

Mrs. Deats,
and

proceeded

approximately half way to the stair well when she decided to turn
around and move her car so as to prevent the possibility of it
being struck due to the slippery conditions and narrowing of the
parking area.

As Mrs. Deats approached the front of her car, she

slipped and fell

sustaining severe injuries to her left knee.

(T.540-542, 732, 737-739, 754-761)

After Mrs. Deats was injured,

she observed

the maintenance man arrive on the upper level.

(T.544, 546)

Mrs. Deats had no reasonable alternative other than

to park in her designated spot.

Because of the early morning

hours she was fearful of parking in other parts of the downtown
city because of transients and because there were no places where
she would be able to park more than two hours without receiving a
citation. (T.525, 526)

i

A large accumulation of snow and ice

had been pushed to

the outside edges of the upper parking terrace.

This snow would

melt during the daytime and because of inadequate drainage would
freeze on the parking terrace overnight often causing a sheet of
ice

to

exist

on

the

parking

(T.603, 711-714, 839-841)

terrace

the

following

morning.

The bank was aware of this condition

and kept sand and salt for the purpose of treating the ice.
3

The

weekend preceding February 27, 1984, a Monday, consisted of warm
days

and

cold

nights

so

that

the

snow

and

ice

that

had

accumulated would have melted during the day and frozen at night.
The bank was aware of this situation, but did not close the
parking terrace, did not treat the parking terrace early enough
to avert the injury received by Mrs. Deats and did not warn Mrs.
Deats of the danger. (T.847-852)
The bank's agents, Mr. Lollie and Mr. Fuitt, testified at
trial that during the winter of 1983-84 they noticed the snow
melt, freezing of water, and drainage problems surrounding the
top level of the bank's parking terrace.

Both testified that a

sheet of ice was created by melting snow and subsequent freezing.
(T.631-633, 839-840)

Both further testified that they understood

the danger involved to invitees using the parking terrace and
walking in the area. (T.634-635, 839, 847)

Mr. Fuitt, the bank's

agent in charge of maintenance, also testified that it was his
practice to begin salting, sanding, or servicing the parking
terrace between 7:30 a.m. and 7:45 a.m. and would begin servicing
the area earlier only if there had been a heavy snow the evening
before. (T.826, 827)

Mr. Fuitt further testified that it was not

his duty to service the parking terrace on weekends and would
only do so if there had been a major storm on the weekend.
(T.841)

Mr. Lollie, the bank's parking attendant, also testified

that on a few occasions he would salt and sand the top level of
the parking terrace

upon his arrival for work at 8:00

a.m.

because the terrace had not yet been serviced and conditions were
unsafe. (T.634-637)
4

The morning Mrs* Deats fell, the top level of the terrace
was covered with ice, the surface area had not been salted or
sanded and there was nothing to indicate that the bank had begun
servicing

the area

in any way despite bank's agents having

knowledge of the possibility of an unnatural accumulation of ice
due to the snow melt and drainage problems, and despite bank's
agent knowing that the icy condition was difficult to see and
appreciate. (T.540-542, 634-635, 711-714 841, 847-848)

In spite

of the fact that the bank's agents had knowledge of the icy
conditions, appreciated the danger, and knew that invitees often
arrived at early hours, the parking terrace was not salted or
sanded on a regular basis until 7:30 a.m. to 7:45 a.m. and on
occasion not until after 8:00 a.m. and after the arrival of
several

vehicles.

(T.635-637)

Further, the bank posted no

warnings or safety notices concerning the dangerous condition
despite the fact that icy condition existed on and off from
November, 1983 through February, 1984. (T.638, 720-723, 848)
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS
The evidence presented at the time of trial demonstrated
the bank's negligence as a matter of law.

However, the jury

failed to apportion negligence among the parties despite the
court's further instructions to do so.

The finding of the jury

that the bank was not negligent was based upon Instruction No. 25
which required Mrs. Deats to avoid the hazard regardless of the
bank's negligence.

This determination resulted in the jury's

applying a contributory negligence standard as a result of Mrs.
Deats's alleged failure to avoid a hazard.
5

A requirement that

Mrs, Deats avoid the hazard clearly constitutes prejudicial error
in law in that it misstated Mrs. Deats' required duty of care and
confused the jury.

The trial court erred in denying Mrs. Deats1

motion for new trial on the grounds of insufficiency of evidence
to

justify

appellant

the verdict
respectfully

and

error

in

requests that

law.

this

Therefore, the

court

remand this

matter to the trial court for a new trial.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE JUDGMENT SHOULD BE REVERSED SINCE

THE JURY1 S FINDING THAT THE DEFENDANT WAS NOT NEGLIGENT
IS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE FACTS IN EVIDENCE
The

jury's

verdict

and

finding

of

no

contrary to evidence, unreasonable, and unjust.

negligence

is

In Nelson v.

Truj-illo, 657 P.2d 730 (Utah 1982), the Supreme Court of Utah
held that the denial of a motion for new trial will be upheld on
appeal

unless,

"the

evidence

to

support

the

verdict

was

completely lacking or was so slight and unconvincing as to make
the verdict plainly unreasonable and unjust."
v. Baum, 569 P.2d 1125, 1127 (Utah 1977).

See also McCloud

Applying this standard

to the case at hand, it is clear from the evidence that the bank
was at least partially negligent.
of

a

business

invitor

was

The standard of care required

well

defined

Instructions Numbers 18, 19, and 20.
keep the premises in a reasonably
timely

and

periodic

inspection

in

the

court's

A business invitor must

safe condition, must make

for

existing

defects, must

seasonably repair all defects which endanger invitees, or must
6

warn the invitee of the condition and risks involved therein.
Rest. Torts 2d 341A, 343 and comments (b) and (e); See also,
Woolston v. Wells, 687 P.2d 144 (Or. 1984); Lannon v. Taco Bell,
inc. , 708 P.2d 1370 (Colo. App. 1985).
The evidence is undisputed that on February 27, 1984 the
bankfs agent had not applied salt or sand to the terrace, had not
made previous inspection of the terrace the weekend before, and
had made

no

other

efforts

to

remove

or

alleviate

the icy

condition despite having knowledge of the dangerous condition
created

by

847-848)

the melting

slow

and ice. (T.542, 840-842, 845,

In addition, the bank did not close of the terrace or

give notice of the dangerous condition. (T.847-852)

This being

the case, the evidence is so slight and unconvincing that the
verdict rendered was "plainly unreasonable and unjust." The jury
made no attempt to apportion negligence
despite overwhelming

evidence

between the parties

of the bank's negligence.

As

indicated in the affidavits of the jurors, the jury concluded
that

Mrs. Deats was

required

to

avoid

the parking

entirely and, therefore, the bank was not negligent.

terrace

(R.375-378)

Even without the benefit of the affidavits of the two
jurors, an examination of the evidence and the required duty of a
business invitor clearly indicates that the jury's finding of no
negligence on behalf of the bank is contrary to law.

The bank

failed to warn, failed to inspect, failed to remove, and failed
to salt or sand the icy condition despite having knowledge of its
presence and despite knowing that the dangerous condition was
difficult to see and appreciate.
7

This being the case, the jury's

verdict of no cause of action and finding of no negligence is
plainly unreasonable and this court should remand the case for a
new trial.
POINT II
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 25 CONSTITUTES AN ERROR IN LAW SINCE IT
MISSTATES THE PLAINTIFF'S REQUIRED DUTY OF CARE.
Instruction No. 25 states that:
Ordinarily, a plaintiff in any action has the duty
of seeing and avoiding, if reasonable, a hazard
which is plainly visible, and if the plaintiff
reasonably failed to do so, then the plaintiff is
negligent either in failing to look or in failing to
head what he or she saw.
The only Utah case that the appellant can find which tends to
support the language of Instruction No. 25 is Whitman v. W. T.
Grant <Io. , 16 Utah 2d 81, 395 P.2d 918 (1964).
plaintiff attempted to recover for

In that case the

injuries he suffered from

falling down an elevator shaft in a department store.

A summary

judgment was granted because the plaintiff's statement showed
that he was contributorily negligent.
negligence was a total bar to recovery.

At that time contributory
Addressing the issue of

contributory negligence, the Court stated as follows:
The plaintiff
is confronted with the basic
proposition that when there is a hazard which is
plainly visible, ordinarily one is charged with the
duty of seeing and avoiding it. And if he fails to
do so, it is concluded that he was negligent either
in failing to look, or in failing to heed what he
saw. In so saying here, we have not lost sight of
certain principles which we recognize as modifying
this rule under proper circumstances, but which upon
application to the facts here shown do not bring
about the results contented for by the plaintiff.
The first of these is that in applying the
universally accepted standard of care: That of the
ordinary, reasonable and prudent man under the
circumstances, .... "
8

The Whitman

case

refers

to

the

case

of

Richard

v.

Andersonf 9 Utah 2d 17, 337 P.2d 59 (1959), a case involving an
automobile accident and the issue of whether the plaintiff saw
what was plain to be seen.

Whitman defined the standard of care

to which a plaintiff is held as "...the degree of caution for his
own safety that an ordinary prudent person would (exercise) under
the circumstances."

It should be noted that the Richards case

was also decided under contributory negligence which barred a
recovery by a plaintiff.

The appellant has been unable to find

any recent Utah Supreme Court case which justifies or supports
the law as stated in Instruction No. 25.
Generally in a slip and fall case, the plaintiff having a
knowledge of the presence of snow or ice is charged with the duty
of exercising a degree of care commensurate with such knowledge.
However, knowledge of the presence of snow and ice is only a
circumstance

to

be considered

by the jury

along with other

evidence in determining if the plaintiff exercised due care.
Gri-zzel- v. Foxx, 348 SW 2d 815 (1961) .

Mere knowledge of an icy

condition before passing over it does not establish negligence on
the part of a business invitee.

The test is whether an invitee,

knowing of the icy condition, reasonably believed or had the
right to believe that he or she could use the pathway safely by
the exercise of reasonable care.
A 2d 98 (1972).
to

the

standard

protection.

Isaacson v.ffussonCollege, 297

In other words, a business invitee is also held
of

exercising

reasonable

care for his own

The standard of care to be used is that of an

ordinary prudent person under the same or similar circumstances.
9

Meni-sh v-, Pollrrcrer Company, 356 A. 2d 323 (1976) . An invitee is
not

contributorily

negligent

unless

herself to a risk of bodily harm.

she

unreasonably

exposes

Ti chenor v.- Lohaus, 322 NW 2d

629 (Nebraska 1982).
Instruction No. 25 imposes a duty upon the plaintiff of
seeing and avoiding a hazard and suggests that the plaintiff is
barred from recovery if she fails to avoid the icy condition of
the parking terrace regardless of whether or not she exercised
reasonable

care

affidavits

submitted

indicate

in her

that

the

attempt

from

two

jury

to traverse
of

believed

the

jury

that

the area.
members

was

the

The

clearly

import

of

Instruction No. 25 and therefore did not attempt to apportion any
negligence between the parties or determine if the bank was
negligent.

Clearly the attention of the jury should be focused

on whether a reasonably prudent person in the exercise of due
care would have incurred the risk, despite her knowledge of it
and, if so, whether she would have conducted herself in a manner
in which

the

circumstances

plaintiff

acted

including

the

in

light

appreciated

of

all

surrounding

risk.

Jacobsen

Co nst ru ct ion-Company v-. -•Strtxcbo-Lite- Englneerrngy lire. , 619 P. 2d
306 (Utah 1980)

Then, if the plaintiff's unreasonableness is

viewed to be less than that of the defendant, any damages allowed
must be diminished in proportion to the amount of negligence
attributed to the plaintiff.
The
Instruction

appellant's
No.

25

counsel

prior

to

the

strenuously
submission

objected
to

the

to
jury

specifically because of the fear it would result in the jury
10

feeling that they had no option but to deny Mrs. Deats recovery
if she failed to avoid the danger.

Under the circumstances, it

is apparent that the jury failed to follow the instructions or
the special verdict
import

of

form.

Instruction

This court must

No.

25

simply

not disregard

because

the

trial

the

court

included instructions to the jury defining the bank's duties, but
should

recognize

decision.

the

error

and

its

effect

Instruction No. 25 constituted

upon

the

a prejudicial

jury's
error

which misled the jury and misstated plaintiff's duty of care.
Therefore,

plaintiff's

motion

for

new

trial

should

have been

granted.
CONCLUSION
The appellant respectfully requests that this court remand
this case to the district court for new trial on the basis that
an

error

in law was

committed

which

resulted

in an

improper

finding of no negligence and no cause of action, and on the basis
that the jury's verdict was plainly unreasonable and contrary to
the evidence presented as a matter of law.
DATED this

day of October, 1986.

ROBERT A. ECHARD
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify a copy of the foregoing Brief was mailed,
postage prepaid, this

day of October, 1986, to Donald J.

Purser and J. Angus Edwards, Attorneys for Commercial Security
Bank, 340 East Fourth South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111.

ROBERT A. ECHARD
Attorney for Plaintiff
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INSTRUCTION NO.

Ordinarily, a plaintiff in any action has the duty of
seeing and avoiding,

if reasonable, a hazard which

is plainly

visible, and if the plaintiff reasonably failed to do so, then
the

plaintiff

is negligent

either

in

failing

to

look

or

in

failing to heed what he or she saw.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF WEEER:eCfNTY. STATE OF UTA!
WEBER COUNTX/CLERK
KIlHARDR.GUSENS

CINDY DEATSf
Plaintiff,

SPECIAL VERDICT

vs.
COMMERCIAL SECURITY BANK,

Case No.

90084

Defendant.

We, the jury impaneled to try the issues in the aboveentitled

casef

give

the following

answers

to

the

questions

propounded to us.
QUESTION NO. 1:
in question
evidence,

and

was

under

the

At the time and place of the accident
the circumstances

defendant.

Commercial

as

shown

Security

by the
Bank,

negligent?
YES
NO

>£

(If you answered Question No. 1 "yes", answer
question.

the following

If you answered it "no", you need not answer any

further questions.)
QUESTION

NO. 2:

Was the negligence,

if any, of

Commercial Security Bank, a proximate cause of the accident?
YES
NO
(If you have
Question No. 3.

answered

both Question

1 and

2 "yes", answ

If you have answered Question 2 "no", you nee

not answer any further questions.)

Recorded Book

Page 2
Special Vercict

Case No*

P=.ge
Indexed

900 84

QUESTION NO, -3:
in

question

and

under

At the time and place of the accident
the

circumstances

as

shown

by

the

evidence, was the plaintiff, Cindy Deatsf negligent?
YES
NO
QUESTION NO. 4:

Was the negligence, if any, of Cindy

Deats, a proximate cause of the accident?
YES
NO
(If you have answered Questions 1 and 2 "yes" and Questions 3
and 4 "yes", answer the following question.)
QUESTION NO. 5:

Considering all the negligence which

caused the accident at 100%, which percentage of that negligence
is attributable to:
CINDY DEATS:

%

COMMERCIAL SECURITY BANK:

%

TOTAL:
QUESTION NO. 6:
plaintiff,

Cindy

Deats,

100%
What sum would fairly compensate the
for

the

damages,

if

any,

which she

sustained as a result of the accident?
SPECIAL DAMAGES:

$

GENERAL DAMAGES:

$

DATED this &Q*1

day of March, 1986.

CfrvnJU Qio>
FOREMAN

^ u / T
o

53

Recorded Bookl Q O
'•ice
indexed

^
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Donald J . Purser (2663)
J . Angus Edwards (4563)
FOWLER & MOXLEY
Attorneys for Commercial Security Bank
340 East Fourth South
Salt Lake C i t y , Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 328-9841

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
CINDY DEATS,

)
Plaintiff,

)

ORDER OF JUDGMENT
v.

)

Civil No. 90084
COMMERCIAL SECURITY BANK,

)

Defendant.

)

The above-styled cause of action was tried before a j u r y of eight
members on March 18 and 20, 1986.

(8)

Plaintiff was represented by counsel,

Robert A. Echard and defendant, Commercial Security Bank, was represented
by its counsel, Donald J . Purser.
respective cases, the j u r y

After plaintiff and defendant rested their

was provided with the Court's

f u r t h e r provided with a special verdict form.

instructions

and

The j u r y , having found that

under the circumstances as shown by the evidence, the defendant, Commercial
Security
hereby

Bank was not negligent, the complaint in the above-styled case is
dismissed, with prejudice and upon the merits,

costs

to be taxed

against plaintiff.
IT IS SO ORDERED

DATED this

«2L_

day of / ^ ^ < ^

, 1986.

ROTH.
District Court Judge
97b48
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the^£P__ day of March, 1986, I served the
foregoing

Order

of Judgment

upon

the

following,

by

depositing

copies

thereof in the United States mails, postage prepaid, addressed as follows:
Robert A. Echard
427 27th Street
Ogden, UT 84401

1 fy/sJrj^yr ^L.

97b49
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ROBERT A* ECHAHD, 953
Attorney for Plaintiff
635 - 25th Street
Ogden, Utah 84401
801-621-3317

APR

17 2 u3 PM f 88

WEBER COUHTV CLERK
RICHARD R.GREENE

(8/-"

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

CINDY DEATS,
AFFIDAVIT OF
JULIA ETCHEVERRY
Plaintiff,
vs.
COMMERCIAL SECURITY BANK,
Civil No. 90084
Defendant.

STATE OF UTAH

)

COUNTY OF WEBER

)

S3

JULIA ETCHEVERHY, being first duly sworn upon her oath,
deposes and says:
.1 •; .

That

your

affiant

has

personal

knowledge

of

the

information contained in this affidavit and is fully competent to
so testify.
2%

That your affiant was one of the jury members in the

above-captioned lawsuit.
3»

That when the jury retired to the jury room, the jury

reviewed the instructions until they came to Instruction No. 25
which required the plaintiff to avoid the hazard.
AW OFFICE OF

in

time

the

majority

of

the

jury

concluded

At that point
that

since

idley, Echard
&Ward
i - 25TH STREET
DEN, UTAH 84401

375

the

plaintiff had to avoid the hazard, erid bha-fe, consequently, the
bank should have no responsibility for the plaintiff's injury.
4.

That based upon Instruction No. 25, the jury

concluded that it would answer the special interrogatories by
indicating that the defendant was not negligent.

The jury did

not at any time attempt to assess the amount of negligence that
might be attributable to the plaintiff and the amount of
negligence that might be attributed to the defendant.
DATED this

/7

day of April, 1986.

^L^L

JULIA ETCHEVERRY

H&

day of
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this
April, 1986, by JULIA ETCHEVERRY to be her voluntary act and
deed.

iSi?

PUBJJTC

'•"

LuJV^

Residing in:
My Commission Expires iJ%&\/te
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the
foregoing AFFIDAVIT, postage prepaid, to Donald J. Purser and
J. Angus Edwards, Attorneys for Commercial Security Bank, 340
East Fourth South, Salt Lake City, UT 84111, this l)^H^ day of
April, 1986.

SECRETARY

LAW OFFICE OF

irridley, Echart
&Ward

-2-

635 - 25TH STREET
DGDEN. UTAH 8440

376

ROBERT A. ECHAHD, 953
Attorney for Plaintiff
635 - 25th Street
Ogden, Utah 84401
801-621-3317
WEBER CGuVrY CLERK

U P

RICHARD R.GREENE

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

CINDY DEATS,
AFFIDAVIT OF CHARLES SWEET
Plaintiff,
vs.
COMMERCIAL SECURITY BANK,
C i v i l No. 90084
Defendant*

STATE OF UTAH

)

COUNTY OF WEBER

)

ss
CHARLES

SWEET,

being

first

duly

sworn

upon

his

oath,

deposes and says:
1.

That

your

affiant

has

personal

knowledge

of

the

information contained in this affidavit and is fully competent to
so testify.
2+

That your affiant was one of the jury members in the

above-captioned lawsuit and acted as foreman of said jury.
3.

That the jury reviewed the jury instructions and six

of the jury members decided
defendant

had

consequently,

the
should

because

obligation
not

have

of Instruction No. 25 the

to

avoid

parked

on

a
the

hazard;
upper

and,

parking

LAW OFFICE OF

rridley, Echart
&Ward
I35 - 25TH STREE1
GDEN, UTAH 844C

377

terrace.

Based upon Instruction No. 25 the jury answered the

interrogatories stating that the bank was not negligent,
4.
attempted

That your affiant and one of the other jury members
to get

the jury to apportion negligence

between the

defendant and plaintiff, but the remaining jury members felt that
it

was

unnecessary

because

of

the

instruction

requiring

the

plaintiff to avoid the hazard,
5»

That your affiant did not vote with the majority of

the jury in this regard,
DATED this / 7 ^ d a y of April, 1986.

CHARLES SWEET
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this lTt±fo day of April,
1986 by CHARLES SWEET to be his voluntary act and deed.

NOT ATT PUBLIC, Dgd'en, Dt
Utayh ,
My Commission Expires
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify a copy of the foregoing affidavit was
mailed, postage prepaid, this

day of April, 1986, to Donald

J. Purser and J. Angus Edwards, Attorneys for Commercial Security
Bank, 340 East Fourth South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111.

Sff&irffTARY

HT7E-

LAW OFFICE OF

ridley, Echard
&Ward
IS - 25TH STREET
3DEN, UTAH 84401
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DONALD J . PURSER, #2663
FOWLER S PURSER
Attorneys for Defendant
340 East Fourth South
Salt Lake C i t y , Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 328-9841
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
CINDY DEATS,
Plaintiff,

O R D E R

-vs- .
COMMERCIAL SECURITY BANK,

Civil No. 90084

Defendant.
On June 2, 1986, p l a i n t i f f s motion for vacation of the j u r y ' s findings of
fact and entry of judgment thereon was heard by this Court.
represented

by

Richard

Echard

and

Commercial

Security

Plaintiff was
Bank

was

represented by Donald J . Purser.
The court reviewed the arguments, both written and o r a l , submitted by
plaintiff and defendant.

It should be noted that the undersigned judge was

the trial judge in this j u r y t r i a l .
The court finds that there were sufficient evidentiary facts provided to
the Court and the j u r y to support their verdict that

u

[ a ] t the time and place

of the accident in question and under the circumstances as shown by
evidence

. . . "

Commercial Security

Bank was not negligent.

The

the

Court

f u r t h e r finds that while p l a i n t i f f s counsel complains that Instruction No. 25
misstates the law, in fact Instruction No. 25 simply relates to the standard of
care owed by the plaintiff while there were several j u r y instructions provided
to the j u r y defining the standard to support a finding for negligence of the

* *

defendant.

Jury Instruction No. 25, the Court f i n d s , does not misstate the

law.
The Court additionally finds that the verdict of the j u r y did not result
from irregularities in the proceeding or by any misconduct of one or more of
the j u r y members.
Plaintiffs motion for a new trial is denied.
• DATED this

/ O

day of June, 1986.

2
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I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing
Order to the following:
Robert A. Echard, Esq.
635 - 25th Street
Ogden, Utah 84401

lis "T
this
~

day of June, 1986, postage prepaid.

^/^cd^ut

c^^On^X
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